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1 Introduction
In this paper we trace the relationship between firm performance and corporate gov-
ernance in Microfinance institutions (MFI). MFIs supply banking services to micro-
enterprises and supposedly poor families. Most MFIs claim having a dual mission of
reaching poor clients and being financially sustainable. Hence, firm performance should
be measured along both these dimensions. Good corporate governance has been identi-
fied as a key bottleneck in strengthening MFIs’ financial performance and increase their
outreach (Rock et al., 1998; Labie, 2001; Helms, 2006; United Nations, 2006; Otero and
Chu, 2002). However, except for the Hartarska (2005) study of East European MFIs,
the influence of corporate governance on the MFIs’ performance has not been empirically
studied before, partly due to lack of data. This paper aims to fill the void by exploiting
recently released data from third party rating agencies, yielding a unique panel data set
of rated MFIs spanning 57 countries. Thus, we respond to the Morduch (1999); Har-
tarska (2005) request for more studies and, equally important, better data to analyse
the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance in the microfinance
industry.
Microfinance is high on the public agenda after the UN Year of Microcredit in 2005 and
the Nobel Peace Prize to Mohammed Yunus and Grameen Bank in 2006. Christen et al.
(2004) report an astonishing 500 million persons served, mostly with savings accounts,
while the Microcredit Summit in the 2006-meeting in Halifax celebrated the milestone
of 100 million borrowers reached. Nevertheless, microfinance still reaches only a fraction
of the world’s poor (Robinson, 2001; Christen et al., 2004). Hence, there is a supply
challenge in the industry (Helms, 2006; C-GAP, 2004, 2006).
? report systematic differences in governance between banking and manufacturing firms.
This indicates that governance structures are industry specific. Hence, to improve the
performance of MFIs there is a need to better understand the influence of different cor-
porate governance mechanisms in this specific industry. ? point out that beside the
owner-board/manager agency relationship found in nearly all firms, the agency aspects
in the firm-customer interactions are potentially more important in banking than in other
industries. In microfinance this becomes even more evident because the repayment prob-
lem is so central1.
The point of departure for this article is that corporate governance, understood as the
1Two factors make a MFI’s loan portfolios different from a bank’s; first, because it is generally semi-
or uncollateralized, and second, because repayment time is generally short, ranging from 3 to 12 months.
Thus an MFI risks steep deterioration of its portfolio in a matter of weeks only.
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system, or the set of mechanisms, by which organisations are directed and controlled
(OECD, 2004), influences organisations’ performance. Specifically we study the effect
of how the internal mechanisms of top management and ownership together with the
external mechanisms competition and regulations influence the financial and outreach
performance of MFIs.
The results show that the overall financial performance (ROA) is improved when the
roles of CEO and chairman are split, when the CEO is a woman, and when loans are
made to individuals. Stronger competition reduces operational costs, portfolio yield and
return on assets. The effect of regulation turns out to be insignificant. We find no
significant board size and composition effects upon average loans and credit clients, yet
the loan methodology is an important determinant for these outreach variables. Outreach,
measured by the number of credit clients served and clients’ poverty level, is improved
with group lending. There is generally no difference between nonprofit organizations and
shareholder firms neither in financial performance nor in outreach.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the few related studies and 3
develops hypotheses. Then section 4 gives an overview of the data sources and estimation
method, while we report descriptive statistics in section 5. In section 6 the econometric
evidence is presented, before the concluding section 7.
2 Former literature
Hartarska (2005) investigates the relationship between governance mechanisms and finan-
cial performance utilising three surveys of rated and unrated east European MFIs from
three random samples in the period 1998 to 2002. However, the number of observations
is low. In regressions its range is from 46 to 144 in a dataset, depending on the samples
used. Financial performance and outreach constitute dependent variable dimensions, and
governance mechanisms encompass board characteristics, CEO compensation, and own-
ership type2. Several institutional variables as well as firm control variables are included.
She finds that a more independent board has better ROA, but a board with employee
directors gives lower financial performance and lower outreach. The difference between
different ownership types in terms of financial performance and outreach is unnoticeable.
In contrast to our consistently collected global data, Hartarska (2005) utilises east Eu-
ropean data from several sources. Furthermore, while she has a number of variables for
stakeholders, very few observations are present in our study.
2Ownership type refers to the various legal incorporations found in microfinance institutions, ranging
from shareholder owned firms to cooperatives.
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Cull et al. (2007) looks at MFI financial performance and outreach as well, with a focus
on lending methodology3, controlling for capital and labour cost as well as institutional
features. They use data from 124 rated MFIs, and find that financial performance is
improved, up to a point, with individual loans, and that MFIs concentrate more on
individual loans. No governance variables, such as board characteristics or ownership
type, are taken into account.
The limited number of academically based studies available, the lack of more comprehen-
sive global datasets and the fact that several governance mechanisms remain unexplored
indicate a need for our study. For example, neither Hartarska (2005) nor Cull et al. (2007)
take account of the product market competition. Hence, there is a need for investigations
using better data and variables that cover different aspects of governance, and at the
same time take into account characteristics of microfinance.
3 Governance and performance in MFI
3.1 The microfinance challenge
Before discussing specific governance mechanisms, we need to consider the special nature
of banks. As a provider of banking services, the MFI is subject to adverse selection and
moral hazard from credit clients with little or no collateral (Armendariz de Aghion and
Morduch, 2005). Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point out that adverse selection arises since
the bank does not have enough information to differentiate between good and bad risks.
Maybe this insight has particular relevance in the microfinance field, since customers
often have a short or no credit history, and little or no collateral. Moral hazard is the
problem that the borrower will not exert necessary effort to repay the loan, when the
bank is unable to monitor. What sets the new microfinance initiatives apart is that of
finding new ways to deal with these problems through group lending, character lending
and the stepwise building of a credit history4, and thereby, to establish workable business
models.
The adverse selection and moral hazard story on the part of the MFI should be extended
3Lending methodology refers to the way loans are given. Individual loans, group loans, and village
banks – which are bigger groups that often have wider objectives than to serve as a guarantee mechanism
only – are the categories used.
4Hansmann (1996) shows that group lending liability, may be the most conspicuous novelty in mi-
crofinance, was used extensively in 19th century non-profit and mutual banks and insurance companies.
Also Bouman (1995) outlines how informal savings and credit groups are widespread and have been
around for centuries. Thus, the group lending innovation is more a rediscovery than a complete novelty.
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to problems on the part of depositors and borrowers. How can they judge if the MFI
does not use its informational advantage in the money markets to charge too high loan
interest, or to take on too much risk with depositors’ money? These are questions partic-
ularly important to ask in the microfinance market where the level of customer education
is, at best, moderate and people repeatedly experience exploitation and fraud. Thus, the
microfinance industry is beset by mutual adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
It is no surprise that Macey and O’Hara (2003) maintain that the relationships to depos-
itors and borrowers are as important to the success of the bank as the managers’ and the
board’s relationship to its owners. Therefore incentive problems have a dual nature, one
between owners and managers, the other between the MFI and its customers. Further-
more, the special nature of banks as providers of financial infrastructure often requires
public regulations of the bank-customer relationship in order to get customers to entrust
their savings and avoid possible economy-wide breakdowns. Therefore the monitoring of
the bank is not as straightforward as in ordinary firms, and we need to take the MFI’s
regulatory framework into consideration.
3.2 Performance measures
Governance is about achieving corporate goals. For most MFIs, dual goals exist. One
goal is to contribute to development. This involves reaching more clients and poorer pop-
ulation strata, the main outreach ”frontiers” of microfinance (Helms, 2006; Johnson et al.,
2006). The second goal is to do this in a way that achieves financial sustainability and
independence from donors. We analyse the relationship between governance mechanisms
and both outreach and financial performance. As measures for financial performance we
use return on assets (ROA)5, but also variables that go behind ROA, that is, operational
costs and portfolio yield, as Christen (2000) suggests. The outreach measures are the
MFI’s average outstanding loan and the number of credit clients served. The average
outstanding loan is a measure of the so called depth of microfinance, that is, the reaching
out to the poorest segments of customers, and the number of credit clients is a measure
of breadth, for obvious reasons (Schreiner, 2002). Thus, our firm performance measures
should cover a number of interesting features of the microfinance reality.
Table 1 gives an overview of dependent variable definitions.
Table 1
While Rhyne (1998) considers the two main goals of financial performance and outreach
5Debt/equity levels differ considerable between MFIs. Hence, ROA is more appropriate than ROE
when measuring financial results across different institutions.
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to be a ”win-win” situation, claiming that those MFIs that follow the principles of good
banking will also be those that alleviate the most poverty, Woller et al. (1999); Morduch
(2000) think that the proposition is far more complicated, noting that programmes con-
tinue to be subsidised, and that the financially sound MFIs are not those celebrated for
serving the poorest clients. In this paper, we do a simple test of the proposed ”win-
win” relationship by including the outreach variable average loan in one of the ROA
regressions.
3.3 Internal and external governance mechanisms
In this section, we spell out hypotheses concerning the association between firm per-
formance and governance. Since the effects upon outreach are little explored in the
literature and therefore little known, the comments mostly refer to financial performance
only. Table 2 summarises the dependent variables, their definitions and hypotheses to
the variables in table 1.
Table 2
Successful governance should alleviate two-sided adverse selection and moral hazard prob-
lems. We differentiate between internal and external governance mechanisms. The inter-
nal comprise the functions of the CEO and the board, and the ownership type. These
mechanisms are made by choice and are called internal accordingly. We specify external
governance mechanisms as the product market competition and regulation. Both kinds
of governance mechanisms are used in the analysis. Thus, we are able to pinpoint re-
lationships between various forms of governance mechanisms and financial performance
and outreach.
3.4 Internal governance mechanisms
The importance of internal governance mechanisms is recognised in the microfinance
literature (Rock et al., 1998; Otero and Chu, 2002; Helms, 2006). This concerns first of
all board oversight and control of management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Becht et al.,
2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). The owners-board relationship concerns how well
the board is aligned to owner interests, how well the board is informed, and how decisive
the board is (Bøhren and Strøm, 2005). The higher is the score on these dimensions of
the board’s characteristics, the better is financial performance.
In MFIs, the board is supposed to be better aligned if the CEO and chairman are different
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persons, and if the percentage of international directors increases. Independent boards are
considered better able to monitor the CEO on the behalf of the owners. A CEO/chairman
duality may be a sign of CEO entrenchment (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991, 1998), that
is, the opposite of independence, since then the CEO may pursue policies that give him
private benefits. However, Brickley et al. (1997) did not find that firms with a CEO-
chairman split outperformed those with a CEO-chairman duality. On the other hand
Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) found that firm performance was better in firms with
international directors which they consider to be an indication of independence.
Information variables encompass gender and the internal board auditor. We expect that
the better the CEO and the board are informed, the better will financial performance
be. One of the innovations in microfinance has been the targeting of female customers
(Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). Presumably, having a female CEO or a high
fraction of women on the board would help the MFI understand its customers better so
as to separate the good risks from the bad. Our data contain the gender of the CEO.
Thus, this better customer knowledge should influence both the MFI’s operational costs
as well as its overall profitability. Alternatively, gender can be seen as a sign of board
heterogeneity, specified by the fraction of women directors (Shrader et al., 1997). It would
then be grouped among the decisiveness variables. In western companies, the evidence on
gender impact is mixed. However, we prefer to group gender among information variables,
because of its supposedly close link to the MFI’s customers.
Another information variable is the internal board auditor. At its best, the internal
board auditor provides independent, objective assessments on the appropriateness of the
organisation’s internal governance structure and the operating effectiveness of specific
governance activities. This activity should be value enhancing. Policy papers for MFIs
stress the importance of internal audit and recommend that the internal auditor reports
directly to the MFI board (Steinwand, 2000). Hence, in some of our regressions we include
this internal governance variable. Thus, an MFI allowing their internal auditors to report
directly to the board should show higher financial performance.
Information variables could also include CEO experience and educational background as
well as stakeholder representatives. A more experienced CEO is likely to bring better
and more relevant information to the board’s attention. Likewise, representatives of
employees and customers should enhance the bank’s knowledge of its markets, and also,
help to align the stakeholders to the MFI mission. At least, this is the position in the
stakeholder theory (Freeman and Reed, 1983; Blair, 1995; Conger et al., 2001). However,
since stakeholder representatives on boards are almost absent in our dataset we cannot
include them in a meaningful way in regressions. The lack of stakeholder representatives
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is in itself a surprising finding and we recommend future studies to explore the existence
and role of stakeholders in microfinance governance.
When it comes to decisiveness, larger and more heterogeneous boards can bring about
higher decision costs (Mueller, 2003). A reason for this is that a larger board may induce
members to free ride in monitoring, giving the CEO a freer position. Yermack (1996);
Eisenberg et al. (1998); Bøhren and Strøm (2005) report that larger boards are associated
with lower firm performance, measured as Tobin’s Q6 or ROA, and Hartarska (2005)
adds the same negative result in ROA regressions for MFIs. Adams and Mehran (2003)
give contrary evidence for banking firms in the USA. Larger boards improve Tobin’s Q
significantly, but shows no significance for ROA. Thus, in banks the importance of board
may be different from industrial firms. We include board size, but are unable to find
measures of heterogeneity.
The legal incorporation, or the ownership type, may play a role for firm performance.
Similar to regular banking (Rasmussen, 1988; Hansmann, 1996; Labie, 2001), ownership
of MFIs differs widely. Private suppliers are normally incorporated as member based
Cooperatives (COOPs), Non Profit Organisations (NPOs) or Shareholder Firms (SHFs).
NPOs are often considered weaker structures since they lack owners with a financial stake
in the operations (Jansson and Westley, 2004). It is taken as a matter of truth that this
leads to lower financial performance than in SHFs. Gutierrez-Nieto et al. (2007) confirm
that this is the case using data from 30 Latin-American MFIs. Therefore Ledgerwood
and White (2006); Hishigsuren (2006); Fernando (2004) argue for the transformation of
NPOs into SHFs. On the other hand, NPOs are supposed to better reach poor customers.
Hence, the ownership type implies that SHFs should have better financial performance
but reach less poor clients than NPOs.
However, this dichotomy along ownership type need not be the best description. First of
all, the NPO needs to perform well in order to stay in business. The ownership-premise is
that incentive problems between owners and managers are more pronounced in NPOs and
diffused owned firms, but that the NPOs have an offsetting benefit of reducing customer
adverse selection and moral hazard (Hansmann, 1996; Desrochers and Fischer, 2002),
since they are better able to tap into local information networks. Group lending is an
instance of such a local information network mechanism. On the other hand, many SHFs
are hardly run on the shareholder value model, but may also have a commitment to reach
the poor. Thus, the ownership type dichotomy should perhaps be moderated.
Furthermore evidence from comparisons of SHFs and NPOs in other settings contradict
6Tobin’s Q is commonly measured as the firm’s market value divided by the book value of its assets.
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the claim that shareholder owned banks perform better than others. Crespi et al. (2004);
Bøhren and Josefsen (2007) show that the financial performance of savings banks is on
par with commercial banks in Spain and Norway, respectively. Valnek (1998) reports
that the mutual building societies have outperformed the stock retail banks in the UK.
However, in a large survey of banks in 15 European countries Iannotta et al. (2007)
find that mutual banks and government-owned banks exhibit a lower profitability than
privately owned banks, in spite of their lower costs and better loan quality and lower
asset risk.
Historical evidence provided in Cull et al. (2006) show that throughout North Atlantic
countries, intermediaries emerged to supply finance for small businesses and persons,
tapping into local information networks. In France, notaries played this role, in Anglo-
American countries the role was filled by small commercial banks as well as for instance
credit unions, and in Germany and Scandinavian countries the function was filled by
savings banks. Thus, the common practice has been a multitude of ownership types
in the start-up phase of economic development, and of course, in many countries the
different ownership types have survived until today. Furthermore, Rasmussen (1988)
reports historical bank evidence that mutual banks attract smaller customers and take
on less risk than stock banks when regulation is weak.
In summary, recent comparisons of performance in different ownership types as well
as historical evidence suggest that financial performance does not vary systematically
between ownership forms. Therefore an alternative hypothesis may be that both financial
performance and outreach of the two ownership types are equally good.
We operationalise ownership type as NPO, SHF, and other ownership types, and include
dummies to identify the NPO and the SHF. It turns out that the great majority of firms
in our sample are either SHFs or NPOs. The contrast to the remaining ownership types
may not be reliable. Therefore we also perform alternative regressions with a dummy
signifying an SHF if the dummy is 1.
3.5 External governance mechanisms
The external governance mechanisms product market competition and regulation may
be related to firm performance. In general, the more intense the competition, the less
need owners have for internal governance mechanisms (Hart, 1983; Schmidt, 1997), so
that competition is a substitute mechanism to internal governance. Gorton and Win-
ton (2003, p. 465) discuss how increased competition may undermine bank-customer
long-time relationships. Such a relationship allows the bank to earn rents on survivors.
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When relationships are undermined through competition, firm financial performance is
weakened. Thus, from both general and industry specific theories we expect higher com-
petition to go along with lower ROA, but increased efficiency levels.
To measure the level of competition we have created a subjective scale based on general
competition information provided in the rating reports. In the reports the raters provide
written information about market conditions including the level of competition the MFI is
facing. We subjectively assess this information to indicate on a 1 to 7 point scale the level
of market competition. Since the raters have multi-country experience and have rated
dozens of MFIs they should be able to provide judged information. Furthermore, since
many MFIs only have local or regional coverage, proxies for national level of competition
like relative number of MFI-clients in a country would in many cases turn out to be less
reliable than the proxy we are using. Nevertheless, we admit that our proxy may not
be reliable in individual cases, but for the time being we consider it to be the best one
available as it should serve as a rough guide to the relative competition pressures in the
microfinance markets.
Now, look at regulation predictions. A regulated MFI is more likely to earn customer
trust, which should lead to a higher financial performance. On the other hand, Macey
and O’Hara (2003) have pointed at the moral hazard problem of depositor insurance: The
banks may pursue a more risky lending practice when it knows that the government will
guarantee the deposits. Thus, higher agency costs may pull financial performance into
the opposite direction. At the same time regulation is associated with costs like security
requirements, investments in information technology etc. Hence, the final outcome of the
sign for financial performance is uncertain. The outreach effects are contradictory. For
MFIs regulation implies the access to an important and low-cost funding source through
the right to mobilise savings. This gives the MFI the opportunity to increase the number
of clients, but also to increase average loan amounts for existing customers. Therefore
the effects upon depth and breadth in outreach may be uncertain as well, either upon
depth or breadth, or a combination of the two.
3.6 Control variables
Finally, we include control variables that are specific for the MFIs. The inclusion of
these variables will also help to inform the ongoing debate in the microfinance literature
on matters such as the ”microfinance schism” (Morduch, 2000) between financial per-
formance and outreach, and the advantages of group lending. We will comment on the
results for these aspects as well when they yield interesting insights, although the main
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focus is on issues concerning internal and external governance.
First, the loan methodology, whether group or individual lending, may be associated with
firm performance7. Microfinance has produced innovations in lending that may overcome
the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch
(2005) point out that group lending may increase the repayment rate. This happens
because group lending leads to assortative grouping, that is, that the best credit risk
groups band together naturally, out of local knowledge of trustworthiness. MFIs may
have different fractions of group lending. A dummy variable indicates whether the main
loan methodology in the MFI is to group or individual borrowers. The group lending
encompasses village banks and solidarity loans.
Second, MFIs often target their lending at the rural population to a greater extent than or-
dinary banks, although they too struggle to reach rural population (Johnson et al., 2006).
Different proportions of these customer groups may influence firm performance.
The third control variable is the average loan size, considered to be a main cost driver in
MFIs. To the extent that there is a ”mission drift” from reaching poor clients to reaching
the more better-off in some MFI institutions, then this difference should be accounted
for. Likewise, the average labour productivity, the MFI experience, and firm size are
included as controls. The MFI experience variable has been constructed by subtracting
the first year of MFI experience from the year of observation8.
Last, the human development index (Human Development Report, 2006) controls for
country-specific effects. The index is a composite of a country’s average results in three
areas, that is, life expectancy, education, and income (GDP per capita). The figures are
the latest available and are from 2004.
4 Data issues and methodology
The rating reports used are in the public domain at the www.ratingfund.org. The
dataset contains information from risk assessment reports made by five rating agencies:
MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil and M-Cril. Comparisons of the method-
ologies applied by the rating agencies reveal no major differences in MFI assessment.
7Group lending encompasses village banks and solidarity groups. A village bank normally consists of
10-30 members while the size of a solidarity group normally ranges between four and eight persons.
8Our experience variable measures years of experience with microfinance operations. Some organisa-
tions have been involved in other activities before and may be older than the reported years of experience,
while some may have changed their charter and thus legally they are younger than reported.
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All the five agencies are approved official rating agencies by the Rating Fund of the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (C-GAP) (www.ratingfund.org).
Transparency in microfinance has been emphasized as increasingly important. No com-
monly accepted international standards for microfinance existed until some years back,
when the rating agency MicroRate invited the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB),
the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID) and two of the other rating agencies M-Cril and Planet
Rating to agree on a set of commonly used indicators. This resulted in a document pub-
lished by IDB called Performance Indicators for Microfinance Institutions. All five rating
agencies adopted the common ratio-definition.
Rating is considered a benefit in the microfinance industry. According to Ratingfund,
MFIs benefit from rating or assessment in four ways. First, ratings or assessments increase
the financial transparency when it is made publicly accessible for all interested parties.
Second, rating reports provides a benchmark against other MFIs and give the man-
agement of the different organisations the opportunity to compare their results against
peers. Third, ratings make the organisations want to improve performance and through
in-depth analysis of the institution, management can point out areas that need attention.
Fourth, ratings and assessments give investors and donors the opportunity to compare
and monitor standardized information on their investments.
Different organisations sometimes tend to have different ways of presenting their financial
figures. Hence, the rating agencies present some adjusted variables to allow a better
comparison with other organisations. The main adjustments are normally adjustments
considering interest on delinquent loans, elimination of subsidies, standard calculation of
provisions, adjustments for inflation, and adjustments for write-offs on loans. Comparing
the methods of adjustment applied by the different agencies uncover only occasional slight
differences. The source of information should therefore only to a minor degree influence
the data.
The rating agencies differ in their emphasis and abundance of available information.
Thus, different N on different variables and in different years is reported. When needed
all numbers in the dataset have been annualised and dollarised using official exchange
rates at the given time.
The rating reports making up the database are from year 2000 to year 2006 with the vast
majority being from the last three years. In the cases where several rating reports are
available from the same organisation the most recent report (as of different dates during
2006) has been selected.
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The data have a certain sample selection bias, since only rated MFIs enter. However, of
the rated MFIs most rating categories are represented in the data. On a uniform rating
scale from 0-100% the average rating grade is 52.8% with a standard deviation of 17.8%.
Yet, this selection has advantages from an estimation point of view, since much of the
background noise has been eliminated by only including MFIs able and willing to be
rated. This allows for better comparisons of ownership types, those that are regulated,
and so on.
Furthermore, our sample is quite representative of the MFIs practicing microfinance in
a business oriented manner. The vast majority of NPOs and COOPs involved in micro-
finance are very small and not rated. The total number of MFIs that actually practice,
or intend to practice, microfinance in a business oriented manner is also quite limited.
The lack of professional and business oriented MFIs is considered to be a major bottle-
neck in the industry (C-GAP, 2004). Moreover, the largest international lender to MFIs,
Oikocredit, known to be relatively forthcoming to MFI customers in offering loan capital,
has less than 500 MFIs as clients (www.oikocredit.org). This limited number is not
because of lack of capital, but due to lack of potential borrowers with the needed business
orientation in place. In addition Ratingfund has co-funded most of the costs related to
being rated for more than six years, but still only around 300 MFIs have accepted the
offer and become rated. A further piece of evidence comes from Daley-Harris (2006) who
report a total of 3133 MFIs and microcredit programmes. However, of these only 907
had 2500 or more clients. Furthermore Daley-Harris indicate that only 9 MFIs have more
than 1 million clients. These organisations too are screened out in our sample. Hence,
the dataset consisting of 226 MFIs do represent an important and representative share of
the professionally oriented MFIs and the best hopes when it comes to reaching the dual
goal of developmental and financial performance.
4.1 Estimations by random effects
The panel data structure is such that we have repeated observations on the dependent
performance variables for up to four consecutive years, while the dependent governance
variables are often reported only once and thus assumed constant during the whole period.
For instance, board variables are constant. We can estimate the relationship either by
regressions year by year, or choose the random effects method, which allows the inclusion
of all years.
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We follow Greene (2003, p. 294-5) who formulates the random effects model as
yit = x
′
itβ + (α + ui) + ²it (1)
Here, α is the mean of the unobserved heterogeneity, ui is heterogeneity specific to firm i,
while ²it is the remaining firm-year heterogeneity. yit is the dependent variable, and x
′
itβ
are the vector of explanatory variables and the vector of coefficients, respectively. Thus,
this formulation implies that the constant term in the regression must be interpreted as
the average firm-year heterogeneity.
The random effects method amounts to transforming the original data. Using yit, the
dependent variable for the ith case in year t, as an example, the transformed yrit is
yrit =
1
σ²
(yti − θyl) where θ = 1−
σ²√
σ2² + Tσ
2
u
(2)
Here, yl is the individual firm average. σ² is the standard deviation of the residual ²it, and
it is assumed to be constant. σu is the standard deviation of the firm heterogeneity, also
assumed to be constant. T is the number of years of data, that is four in this case.
We find these standard deviations by first running a generalised least squares (GLS)
regression on the data assuming a random effects structure. Then we do the transforma-
tions in (2), and run a three-step least squares (3SLS) (Greene, 2003) on the transformed
data. The full procedure produces about the same coefficients as the original GLS re-
gression, but the standard errors are smaller. Since the assumed relationships are linear,
the 3SLS is a valid method. Using ordinary least squares (OLS) method instead of 3SLS
in the last run gives about the same results as the 3SLS. This is not surprising, since
the 3SLS requires a GLS estimation in the first step. An advantage of 3SLS is that the
method does not depend upon assumptions of distributional form, for instance normality,
in common with other moment-based estimation methods.
5 Descriptive statistics
We start by giving some descriptive statistics. Table 3 shows main values on board and
management characteristics.
Table 3
In the rightmost ’% no’ column we report the percentage of the variable that scores zero.
For instance, 74.4% of the firms have no international directors.
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The number of women in board and management positions is quite high. 25.0% of the
CEOs and 20.6% of presidents are women. The percentage of MFIs with at least one
female director is high, too, but this 71.6% comes from very few observations, only 88.
We are forced to drop this variable in later analyses. The high incidence of women in
microfinance institutions is perhaps natural, since women are often the main customers.
Conversely, with women in management and on the board, the firm should have a better
knowledge of its customer base, that is, it should be better able to overcome information
asymmetries.
Obviously, the CEO is not a novice in business. Only 8.8% have no former business
experience, and only 20.7% have no business education.
High numbers on the board size, few board meetings, as well as the CEO-chairman
duality may all be seen as signs of agency costs. The board size is among the lower in
international comparison. The average is 7.45 directors, and falls within the Council of
microfinance equity funds (2005) recommendation (7-9 directors). In fact, 64.5% of all
boards have 5 to 9 members, with 17.0% below and 18.5% above this range. Also, the
number of board meetings seems to be close to averages found in other industries, while
the CEO-chairman duality is low.
Having an internal auditor reporting to the board is a way to connect board governance
with internal firm governance. In our sample half of the MFIs have an internal auditor
with direct access to the board. Based on the importance given to this measurement in
microfinance policy we consider this low. However, as tables 6 to 9 indicate, the internal
board auditor seems not to have any significant influence on MFI performance.
Table 4 shows the main characteristics of the dependent variables used in the analy-
sis.
Table 4
The table reflects the high portfolio yield usually experienced in MFIs. Thus, an average
of nearly 40% is not a surprise in these markets. The high yield stems mainly from the
high operational costs, in our sample above 31% on average. The average loan is again
a reflection of the ’micro’ in microfinance. The lowest loan amount is USD 15.00, while
the average is USD 794.54. The maximum amount of nearly USD 25,000 is an extreme
case, about twice the size of the second largest. Five institutions excluding the maximum
report an average loan higher than USD 10,000. The median is USD 441.04. We have
kept the extreme case in our dataset since robustness checks indicate that filtering it out
does not significantly influence our overall findings.
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In table 5 we report descriptive statistics on explanatory and control variables not shown
in table 4.
Table 5
The table shows that the number of observations on most variables is far fewer than for
the dependent variables. The reason is simply that these are firm characteristics that we
assume constant over time. For instance, being a shareholder owned firm does not change
from year to year. This has consequences for the choice of the random effects model in
the econometric analysis, see section 4.
The mean of many variables can be interpreted as the percentage of the firms in the
category. Thus, there are 30.1% shareholder owned firms, 58.4% non-governmental or-
ganisations, and 8.8% cooperatives. The remainder belongs to state banks and an ’other’
category.
The table shows that 34.9% of the firms are regulated by the banking authorities. Un-
regulated MFIs are not in a position to accept depositors’ money, which limits their
lending. Our subjective competition measure shows that MFIs rate the competition in
their market as high.
The MFI’s main market served is indicated with the two market variables of urban and
rural. The remaining market indicates MFIs that consider both markets to be of equal
importance to them. Thus, we observe that the rural market is 22.6%, far lower than the
urban. This reflects the MFI’s trouble in reaching the rural market.
Next, the table shows the three categories of loan methodology, the village bank, the
solidarity group, and individual loans. These three categories constitute 99.5% of the
cases. We have created a dummy called loan methodology by merging the village bank
and solidarity group categories into group lending, with individual loans taking up the
remainder. Thus, the dummy is 1 if the main loan methodology practiced by the MFI
is individual loans. We see that group lending constitutes 44.0% of the total, but that
individual loans constitute 55.5%. Thus, individual loans are relatively more important.
This is a surprising finding since group lending has been considered one of the main
attributes of microfinance. What are the driving forces behind the increased practice of
individual lending should become subject for future research.
We also see that the typical MFI is a rather young organisation, although one institution
can trace its microfinance activity roots to 1923 when it started to give loans to small
farmers. However, generally speaking, MFIs have had little time to build a relationship
with their customers, allowing a reduction in informational asymmetry. Berger and Udell
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(1998) sum up empirical evidence from several countries showing that costs for the cus-
tomer tend to decline with the length of the bank-borrower relationship for some small
businesses. Hence, the newness of the industry probably contributes to the high MFI
portfolio yield we have observed in table 4.
A brief comment on the human development index (HDI) is in order. The minimum and
maximum values show that firms come from a wide variety of country background, which
is further corroborated in the country list in the appendix. Gorton and Winton (2003, p.
436) argue that institutions, regulations, and laws are important in the study of financial
intermediaries. For MFI institutions, the inclusion of the HDI may capture some of these
institutional differences.
6 Econometric evidence
We report results from econometric tests of the relationships between the financial per-
formance and the outreach on the one hand, and the internal and external governance
mechanisms on the other. We present results first for traditional financial performance
measures, and then on outreach.
6.1 Financial performance
Table 6 shows the results from regressions with our financial performance measures as
dependent variable. We look at return on assets (ROA), portfolio yield (PY), and oper-
ational cost (OC).
Table 6
We have performed four kinds of regressions for ROA in table 6. The first column includes
international directors and internal board auditor variables, while these are dropped in
column two and in the remaining regressions. We drop these variables in order to increase
the number of observations, and because these variables turn out not to be significant.
In the third ROA column the average loan is included while the loan methodology is left
out. Both cannot be included in the same regression due to high correlation between
the two. When average loan is in the regression, this allows for the test of whether
financial performance and outreach (measured as average loan) are substitutes. A similar
multicollinearity problem occurs with regulation and ownership type, since most SHFs
are regulated while most NPOs are not. However, robustness tests in table 9 where
regulation is left out, show that the ownership type results are not affected. Therefore we
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choose to include both in regressions. Last, in the fourth ROA column we have dropped
ownership types other than SHF and NGO, and replaced these with the dummy variable
ownership type, showing 1 if the firm is an SHF and 0 if it is an NGO. We choose this
last formulation since the number of other ownership types (co-operatives, state MFIs,
and others) is fairly low.
We comment on internal and external governance mechanisms across regressions. Con-
cerning top management characteristics, it turns out that the variables international
directors and internal board auditor are not significant. Board size is not significant ei-
ther, but has a negative sign. The board size result is at odds with common findings in
studies of non-financial firms. However, Adams and Mehran (2003) report a positive, but
non-significant sign for ROA regressions for banks in the USA, while in the Hartarska
(2005) the sign is negative and significant. Thus, our result is weak, but in line with the
extant literature.
We find that the entrenchment effect of CEO/chairman duality has a negative relationship
to ROA, unlike Brickley et al. (1997). However, a female CEO is positive. The two
variables are either significant or very close to significance at the 10% level in all ROA
regressions. The non-significant results of the CEO/chairman duality and the female CEO
for the portfolio yield is interesting compared to their significance in the operational costs
regression. Taken together they imply that management is not able to influence product
prices, but are able to do so for costs. Thus, the CEO/chairman duality turns out to be
associated with higher operational costs, while a female CEO with a lower. The result
for the female CEO confirms the importance of gender for microfinance institutions,
where female customers are often considered to be of special importance. We interpret
this as a way to overcome informational asymmetries. Also, the positive sign for ROA
confirms former findings for female members of top management, such as Welbourne
(1999). In conclusion the results may be taken as a sign that good board composition and
management are important in producing a favourable financial performance in the young
and immature microfinance industry. While the negative impact of the CEO/chairman
duality may be seen as a result of moral hazard in the owner-manager relationship, the
female CEO result shows the importance of the information asymmetries in the bank-
customer relationship. The dual nature of incentive problems in MFIs is confirmed.
Ownership type (SHF or NPO) shows a significant result for the NPO in the portfolio
yield regression only, while the SHF is nowhere significant at the 10% level. This is
obtained when ownership type is specified either as dummy variables for SHF and NPO
as against other ownership types, or as a dummy variable showing either SHF or NPO in
the fourth ROA regression. In the portfolio yield regression, the NPO is significant and
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the SHF is close. We note that the coefficients of the SHF and the NPO are very close in
this regression. This means that in the regression that obtains the significant result, the
coefficients are so close that we cannot differentiate between the two. The upshot is that
ownership type does not differentiate between MFIs. The NPOs are as well in producing
financial performance as their incorporated competitors. This is a surprising finding for
at least two reasons: First because policy makers tend to advocate a shareholder structure
in MFIs and the transformation of NPOs into SHFs, and second, because some promoters
of microfinance argue that the NPOs are needed to avoid mission drift and remain a client
friendly industry. Higher portfolio yield can hardly be considered more client friendly.
However, from a banking perspective our findings are not necessarily surprising. This is
the same result as found in Crespi et al. (2004); Bøhren and Josefsen (2007) for savings
banks compared to commercial banks in Spain and Norway. Another explanation is
that market competition in customer, donor and financial markets drives MFIs to adopt
workable business models, whatever their ownership type, in order to survive and to lend
again.
The external conditions of competition and regulation show significant results for com-
petition. Thus, even though our competition measure is subjective, it captures the effect
that increased competition leads to lower ROA. The result confirms predictions to devel-
opments in long-term bank-customer relationships when the bank is exposed to compe-
tition (Gorton and Winton, 2003, p. 465). This is further reflected in the significant and
negative competition coefficient in the portfolio yield regression and, at the same time,
the non-significant result for operational costs. Competition moves market prices, but
not directly operational costs. For the regulation impact we find no significant results.
Maybe the fact that the MFIs in the sample are rated implies an homogeneity among the
firms with respect to regulation. Maybe transparency is sufficient regulation.
The control variables merit some comments as well. First, loan methodology measures the
effect of group lending. It is a dummy variable being 1 if the loan is for an individual and 0
if it is for group lending. The variable shows expected results, being positive to ROA and
negative to portfolio yield and operational costs. This indicates that ROA is improved
with more individual lending, and that operational costs are lower. The negative result
on portfolio yield may be due to higher competition in these market segments or better
collateral or better credit history in lending to individual customers, allowing the MFI to
reduce its portfolio yield. This evidence supports the ongoing tendency in the industry
to shift attention from group lending to individual lending (Armendariz de Aghion and
Morduch, 2005). Apparently for group lending the cost argument is more important than
the repayment argument. The supposed comparative efficiency in group lending does not
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hold. Hartarska (2005) could not find any significant relationship on this variable.
Second, the market served, urban or rural, turns out to give few significant results. The
urban market dummy is significant in the portfolio yield regression. Urban markets tend
to drive portfolio yields higher. This result could be due to better business opportunities
available in urban areas compared to the agriculturally based rural economy. But may
be the few significant results also point out that doing good banking in rural markets
is possible. Whether such a positivistic view on rural lending holds true should be the
subject for further research.
A third aspect concerns the average loan, which shows a positive and significant sign
for the ROA. This implies that financial performance and outreach are to some extent
substitutes. A higher average loan brings better ROA. So reaching out to poor clients
with smaller average loans lowers the ROA. This ”microfinance schism” has been hotly
discussed in the microfinance literature (Woller et al., 1999; Morduch, 2000; Schreiner,
2002; Rhyne, 1998), and we favour those who say that outreach and financial performance
are substitutes. Nevertheless, our results indicate that good banking in terms of financial
performance can be performed on small loans. However, the price seems to be that
outreach, in terms of reaching poorer clients, is lower than it could otherwise be.
Finally, including labour productivity, MFI experience, firm size, and a country spe-
cific variable, the human development index, underlines the necessity of bringing control
variables into play.
In another unreported regression, we tried portfolio yield adjusted for inflation. Presum-
ably, the inflation is very different between countries, and therefore a measure adjusted
for inflation should give better results. Yet, we did not obtain results that differ much
from those reported in table 6, neither for significant results nor for coefficient values.
The reason for these results is first, that we include a country control variable (HDI), and
second, that the random effects method uses deviations from the individual firm’s average
as part of the data transformations, thus wiping out individual heterogeneity.
The discussion so far yields five conclusions. First, the discussion of top management
influence shows that the agency conflict between owners and management expressed in
the CEO/chairman duality is confirmed. Also, the beneficial effect of the female CEO
points to a diminution of informational asymmetries in the bank-customer relationship.
The second main conclusion is that ownership type does not differentiate between MFIs.
This means that ownerless MFIs such as NPOs are as capable of producing a favourable
or unfavourable financial performance as a shareholder owned MFI. Our sample indicates
that from a governance point of view there is no need to change legal incorporation to
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a shareholder owned firm. Third, competition is a major determinant of firm financial
performance, mediating the influence of internal governance variables. Fourth, financial
performance is improved with individual loans. The fifth conclusion is that financial
performance and outreach are substitutes, at least to some extent.
6.2 Outreach
Table 7 shows regressions of two measures of outreach against our variables.
Table 7
Top management variables have little impact upon outreach. In fact, only board size turns
out to be significant for average loan. A larger board tends to give smaller loans, showing
that the larger the board, the lower is the average loan. Thus, in terms of outreach,
boards should be large. However, this runs counter to most financial performance results
on board size in the literature, where larger boards are associated with higher agency
costs. The reason given is that members in a large board may free ride on other members
monitoring, with the result that the overall monitoring is weaker. Possibly, such an
effect turns out for the average loan as well. We saw in table 6 that ROA is reduced
with lower average loans. Thus, a larger board that does not keep management focussed
upon financial performance is more willing to grant smaller loans. The positive, although
insignificant, board size coefficient in the credit clients regression confirms the result.
Ownership type matters as little for outreach as it does for financial performance. Only
one significant result is obtained, and then the coefficient values for the SHF and the NPO
are about the same. Thus, different ownership types do not imply differences in depth
and breadth outreach. The SHF reaches poor clients and as many clients just as well as
NPOs. Our interpretation of this result is that many SHFs are committed to reaching
poor clients, and not only focussed on producing satisfactory financial results. Likewise,
since NPOs need to perform financially well in order to sustain lending, a curtailment of
the outreach may be necessary. In all, these adjustments in both ownership types make
the SHFs and NPOs fairly alike on both financial and outreach goals.
External conditions, competition and regulation, have no significant signs in outreach.
This is in stark contrast to the results for financial performance.
In fact, the control variables turn out to be the source of importance for outreach. This
is perhaps not surprising since our control variables contain variables typical for the
microfinance industry.
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Loan methodology turn out to be a major source of importance on both outreach dimen-
sions. Individual loans tends to be associated with higher average loans and at the same
time a decrease in the number of credit clients. The converse of this is of course that
group lending improves outreach measures. The loan methodology finding confirms the
results in Cull et al. (2007).
We also see that the MFI experience is significant and positive in the average loan regres-
sion, but negative in the credit clients regression. Thus, with time the MFI will tend to
give more individual loans, and the number of clients is restricted. This seems to indicate
that the MFI will increasingly concentrate on the more profitable individual customers,
as the MFI learns who is a good risk.
When comparing these findings with the better financial performance related to individual
lending and the ongoing tendency in the industry to shift from group loans to individual
loans (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005), this might indicate that the industry
is putting increased emphasis on financial performance and less on outreach. Whether
this is the case should be subject for further research.
6.3 Robustness regressions
Are the results robust to alternative specifications? Tables 6 and 7 give various spec-
ifications, but here we look at possible multicollienarity problems among explanatory
variables. The most likely candidates concern external governance mechanisms and own-
ership types.
Most NPOs are not regulated, while most of the SHFs are. A simple cross-tabulation
for the last year of data reveals that 75.4 per cent of the SHFs are regulated, while only
11.3 per cent of the NPOs are. Furthermore, competition is perhaps the most pronounced
among unregulated MFIs. Competitive pressures drove a number of banks out of business
after the industry was deregulated in the 80s in the USA (Gorton and Winton, 2003, p.
520). It is also a possibility that ownership type is related to competition. The historical
evidence of Cull et al. (2006) shows that non-SHFs appeared at an early development
stage when no banking alternatives existed. The same could be the case here, imply-
ing that non-SHFs will be associated with low competition. If these arguments hold,
multicollinearity problems occur in regressions.
To investigate the potential for multicollinearity problems in regressions in tables 6 and 7
we run correlation analysis of external governance mechanisms and ownership type. Table
8 shows the correlations among ownership types, competition, and regulation.
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Table 8
The table shows that regulation is indeed strongly correlated with ownership types, but
that other variables have low correlations. Thus, the multicollinearity problem of keeping
both regulation and ownership types in the same regression seems worth investigating.
We test for the significance of leaving either regulation or ownership type in robustness
regressions.
Table 9 gives results when we have removed first regulation and then ownership type in
regressions where ROA and the average loan are dependent variables.
Table 9
We should compare the ROA results with the second column in table 6 and the average
loan results with the second column in Table 7. The table 9 evidence largely conforms to
earlier findings. In the ROA regressions the significance of the CEO/chairman duality,
the female CEO and the MFI age come out more clearly. The CEO/chairman duality is
nearly significant at the 10.0% level in the second regression in table 9. In the outreach
regressions the board size, NPO, and rural market variables are similarly close to signif-
icance. At the same time, the coefficient values remain in the same area as before. But
neither ownership types nor regulation become significant when leaving either of them
out. Thus, the effect of multicollinearity is evident, but it does not affect the variables
themselves.
Overall, the multicollinearity test does not upset earlier conclusions. Specifically, the
ownership type conclusion is upheld. The ownership types do not appear to perform
differently in the microfinance market.
7 Conclusion
This article studies the effect of corporate governance in microfinance institutions (MFIs).
Utilising a comparatively large and unique self constructed dataset based on rating reports
spanning four years we are able to study how various internal and external governance
mechanism influence different dimensions of financial performance and outreach. We
reach the following main conclusions:
• MFIs need to improve top management characteristics just as much as ordinary
firms. We find that a CEO/chairman duality is associated with a lower ROA and
higher operational costs, but a female CEO with higher ROA and lower operational
22
costs. The findings confirm theories of agency relationships in both the owner-
management dimension as well as in the bank-customer dimension.
• The legal incorporation of the MFI matters less than how the firm is run. This
includes both top management characteristics and the choice of group versus in-
dividual loans. We could not find that a shareholder owned firm brings better
profitability or lower outreach than non-profit organisations. This shows that MFIs
are equally good or bad at creating profitability and reaching the poor indepen-
dently of ownership type.
• Competition is a major driver of financial performance. In particular, the portfolio
yield is lower with higher competition. This means that more competition among
MFIs will bring lower interest rates to clients, but lower ROA to MFIs.
• Group lending does not contribute positively to financial performance, but to out-
reach. Thus, if the MFI wants to reach the poorer fractions of the population it
should stick to group lending. However, its financial sustainability will be nega-
tively affected. On the other hand, if the objective is to lend again without donor
support and to improve its financial performance it should concentrate more on
giving individual loans and less on group loans.
• Financial performance and outreach are competing objectives. ROA increases with
average loan size. We find no ”win-win” logic between poverty outreach and finan-
cial performance.
The conclusions could bring about a rethinking of some assumed truths in microfinance.
Specifically,
• The call for transforming NPOs into shareholder owned firms lacks foundation.
Instead, a pragmatic attitude is needed. Different incorporations work well side by
side, and for particular clients and MFIs, a non-profit organisation may work better
than a shareholder owned.
• There is a need to keep up and to strengthen close ties to customers in order to
overcome informational asymmetries. However, this should not necessarily be done
through group lending as this approach increases costs.
• A viable MFI needs to be profitable. Thus, as long as donors or governments are not
willing to take on a long term obligation to subsidies9, good financial performance
needs to be accepted, even if this means lower outreach in the short term.
9Long term subsidies of microfinance loans is not necessarily a bad idea (Morduch, 1999).
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• Stronger competition among MFIs should be encouraged. The role of the state
should thus be to foster competition in the MFI field. This is perhaps the major
contribution the state can make for microfinance.
Some answers in microfinance governance have been found, more questions remain. We
find it puzzling that stakeholders are virtually absent in MFI boards when so many
MFIs are organised as non-profit organisations. Also, the similarity of financial and
outreach performance in SHFs and NPOs calls for an investigation into causes for this.
Can it be that the NPOs have different governance systems than SHFs, for instance
a more independent board? What are the driving forces behind policy advocates’ call
for transformation of NPOs into SHFs and the overall regulation of MFIs? Are MFIs
becoming less concerned about outreach and more about financial performance? The
puzzles are still many in the young and much celebrated microfinance industry.
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Table 1 Definitions of dependent variables used in analyses
Variable Explanation
Financial performance
ROA Return on assets
Portfolio yield The portfolio yield at the end of the period
Operational costs Operating expenses divided by the annual average total loan portfolio
Debt/equity Total debt, including savings, divided by equity
Outreach
Average loan Clients average outstanding loan
Credit clients The number of credit clients
Branch offices The number of branch offices
Table 2 Definitions of independent variables and their hypothesised sign to financial
(FinP) and outreach firm performance
Hypothesis
Variable Explanation FinP Outreach
Board size The number of directors - -
International directors International directors divided by board size + -
CEO/chairman duality CEO and chairman are the same person - -
Female CEO? A dummy indicating a female when 1 + +
Internal board auditor A dummy being 1 if internal board auditor
reports directly to the board + -/+
SHF Shareholder firm + -
NPO Non-profit microfinance firm -/+ +
Rural/urban market A dummy being 1 if main market is urban - -
Loan methodology A dummy being 1
if loans are mainly made to individuals - -
Competition A subjective scale from 1 to 7 with higher
values indicating stronger competition - +
Regulation A dummy being 1 if the MFI
is regulated by banking authorities -/+ +
MFI experience Years of experience as a MFI
Labour productivity The total number of loan clients divided by
the total number of employees
Firm size The natural logarithm of assets
Human Development A composite index covering life expectancy,
Index education, and income (GDP per capita)
Table 3 Board and management characteristics
Mean Std Min Max N % no
Board size 7.450 4.013 0.000 33.000 200
International directors 0.591 1.234 0.000 6.000 176 74.4
Female directors 1.670 1.799 0.000 7.000 88 28.4
Debt holder directors 0.054 0.357 0.000 3.000 185 97.3
Board meetings per year 7.318 6.673 0.000 52.000 129
Female CEO? 0.250 0.434 0.000 1.000 188 75.0
Female board president? 0.206 0.406 0.000 1.000 155 79.4
CEO chairman duality 0.154 0.362 0.000 1.000 195 84.6
CEO’s business experience 0.912 0.284 0.000 1.000 171 8.8
CEO’s business education 0.793 0.407 0.000 1.000 92 20.7
Internal board auditor 0.489 0.501 0.000 1.000 186 51.1
Table 4 Descriptive statistics on dependent variables used in analysis
Variable Mean Std Error Min Max N
ROA 0.016 0.124 -0.749 0.790 725
Portfolio yield 0.391 0.203 0.034 1.825 724
Operational costs 0.313 0.274 -0.599 3.507 702
Average loan 795 1493 15 24589 726
Credit clients 14504 29329 0 394374 729
Table 5 Descriptive statistics on independent variables relevant for econometric analysis
Variable Mean Std Error Min Max N
Shareholder owned firms 0.301 0.460 0.000 1.000 226
Non-governmental organisation 0.584 0.494 0.000 1.000 226
Cooperative organisation 0.088 0.285 0.000 1.000 226
Mainly urban market 0.369 0.484 0.000 1.000 217
Mainly rural market 0.226 0.419 0.000 1.000 217
Village bank 0.258 0.439 0.000 1.000 209
Solidarity group 0.182 0.387 0.000 1.000 209
Individual loan 0.555 0.498 0.000 1.000 209
Competition 4.485 1.721 1.000 7.000 204
Regulation 0.349 0.478 0.000 1.000 212
First year microfinance experience 1993.199 7.987 1923 2004 226
MFI experience 12.801 7.974 2 83 226
Labour productivity 129.403 83.156 6.569 720.339 720
Firm size (log) 15.037 1.359 9.856 19.337 749
Human Development Index 0.683 0.122 0.338 0.863 222
Table 6 Financial performance measures regressed on top management, ownership types,
and external variables. Random effects panel data 3SLS estimation on four years of
observations. The coefficients are scaled up by 100.
Dependent variable
Portfolio Operational
ROA ROA ROA ROA yield costs
Constant -11.12 -22.03 -30.00∗∗ -24.36∗ 69.18∗∗ 134.96∗∗
Board size -0.01 -0.17 -0.12 -0.26 -0.03 0.28
International directors -4.57
CEO/chairman duality -5.61∗ -4.85 -4.63 -4.54 3.69 10.01∗
Female CEO? 4.19 4.86∗ 4.04 5.10∗ -2.21 -9.17∗∗
Internal board auditor 0.20
SHF 2.36 1.01 2.71 10.94 6.93
NPO 2.85 3.94 5.26 11.69∗ 6.72
Ownership type -3.82
Competition -1.12 -1.84∗∗ -2.01∗∗ -2.00∗∗ -2.01∗ -0.36
Regulation 0.44 1.47 1.39 2.60 1.23 2.75
Loan methodology 4.55 4.91∗ 5.18∗∗ -9.02∗∗ -12.39∗∗
Urban market 1.49 1.30 1.56 1.29 7.45∗ 4.02
Rural market 7.02 1.70 0.09 0.22 -2.34 0.27
Average loan 2.03∗
Labour productivity 0.03∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.02∗ -0.02
MFI experience -0.26∗ -0.23 -0.24 -0.15 -0.39∗ 0.16
Firm size 0.52 1.40∗∗ 1.29 1.70∗∗ -3.45∗∗ -8.29∗∗
Human Dev. Index 4.67 5.27 4.18 8.05 34.49∗ 29.00
Wald F (sign.) 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 287 395 402 373 397 383
The Wald test (Greene, 2003, p. 107) is here a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the given equation are
all zero. A low value indicates null hypothesis rejection. If R is the q ×K matrix of q restrictions and K coefficients, γˆ
the K vector of coefficients, and r the vector of the q restrictions, the Wald χ2(q) statistic is
χ2(q) = (r −Rγˆ)′ [RΣXR′]−1 (r −Rγˆ), where ΣX is the estimated covariance matrix of coefficients.
Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗).
’Ownership type’ is a binary variable showing 1 if the MFI is a shareholder owned firm and 0 if it is a non-profit,
voluntary organisation. ’Competition’ is a self-constructed measure showing . . . ’˙Loan methodology’ is a binary variable
showing 1 if loans are mainly made to individuals and 0 if loans are mainly to groups.
Table 7 Outreach performance, specified as average loan and the number of credit clients,
regressed against board characteristics, MFI innovations and external variables. Random
effects panel data 3SLS estimation on four years of observations.
Dependent variable
Average Average Credit
loan loan clients
Constant 0.51 -0.44 1.42
Board size -0.03 -0.05∗ 0.04
International directors 0.11
CEO/chairman duality -0.05 -0.03 0.10
Female CEO? 0.03 -0.01 0.01
Internal board auditor 0.02
SHF -0.67 -0.78∗ 0.20
NGO -0.52 -0.54 0.25
Competition 0.02 0.06 -0.07
Regulation 0.10 0.22 0.03
Loan methodology 0.71∗∗ 0.61∗∗ -0.46∗∗
Urban market 0.01 0.08 -0.10
Rural market 0.86∗ 0.48 -0.57
(Labour productivity)·100 0.42∗∗ 0. 34∗∗ 0.48∗∗
MFI experience 0.01 0.02∗∗ -0.04∗∗
Firm size 0.37∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.59∗∗
Human Dev. Index 0.96 2.24∗∗ -2.50∗∗
Wald F (sign.) 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 284 393 396
Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗).
The Wald test is explained in table 6.
Table 8 Bivariate correlations between external governance mechanisms and ownership
types in 2006
Competition Regulation
Regulation Pearson Correlation -0.013
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.861
N 192
SHF Pearson Correlation 0.021 0.565
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.764 0.000
N 204 212
NGO Pearson Correlation 0.071 -0.588
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.316 0.000
N 204 212
Table 9 Robustness tests when regulation and ownership types are removed in regressions
for ROA and average loan. Random effects panel data 3SLS estimation on four years of
observations. For ROA estimations, all coefficients are scaled up by 100.
ROA Average loan
Regulation Own’ship Regulation Own’ship
removed removed removed removed
Constant -24.02∗ -19.39 -0.323 -1.002
Board size -0.12 -0.05 -0.044 -0.054∗
CEO/chairman duality -5.32∗ -4.78 -0.110 -0.109
Female CEO? 4.63∗ 4.78∗ -0.001 0.074
SHF 1.97 -0.674∗
NGO 3.54 -0.607
Competition -1.74∗∗ -1.65∗∗ 0.078 0.052
Regulation -0.23 0.115
Loan methodology 5.36∗∗ 4.91∗ 0.655∗∗ 0.582∗∗
Urban market 1.31 1.47 0.069 0.109
Rural market 3.15 1.23 0.556 0.565
Labour productivity 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗
MFI experience -0.24∗ -0.24∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.020∗∗
Firm size 1.49∗∗ 1.35∗∗ 0.347∗∗ 0.361∗∗
Human dev. Index 4.43 4.84 2.100∗∗ 2.185∗∗
Wald F (sign.) 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000
N 409 395 407 393
The Wald test is explained in table 6.
Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗).
A Appendix: Data descriptions
Table 10
Table 10 Countries in the data base
1 Albania 16 Dominican Republic 30 Kazakhstan 44 Peru
2 Argentina 17 East Timor 31 Kenya 45 Philippines
3 Armenia 18 Ecuador 32 Kyrgyzstan 46 Romania
4 Azerbaijan 19 Egypt 33 Madagascar 47 Russian Federation
5 Bangladesh 20 El Salvador 34 Mali 48 Senegal
6 Benin 21 Ethiopia 35 Mexico 49 South Africa
7 Bolivia 22 Georgia 36 Moldova 50 Sri Lanka
8 Bosnia Hercegovina 23 Guatemela 37 Mongolia 51 Tanzania
9 Brazil 24 Guinee 38 Morocco 52 Togo
10 Bulgaria 25 Haiti 39 Nepal 53 Trinidad and Tobago
11 Burkina Faso 26 Honduras 40 Nicaragua 54 Tunisia
12 Cambodia 27 India 41 Nigeria 55 Uganda
13 Cameroun 28 Indonesia 42 Pakistan 56 Vietnam
14 Chile 29 Jordan 43 Paraguay 57 Yugoslavia
15 Colombia
